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 1 
INVALUABLE JUSTICE: 
HEIDEGGER, DERRIDA, AND DAOISM 
THINKING OF VALUES AND JUSTICE 
Steven Burik 
 
What can comparative philosophy contribute to thinking about values, economics, and justice? 
Can we apply philosophy in general, and comparative philosophy in particular, to these problems 
directly? Martin Heidegger, one of the protagonists of this article, has on occasion made it clear 
that philosophy is literally “useless”1 and so let me start with one of my favourite Heidegger 
quotes, to give the reader an indication of what this paper tries to think: “philosophy … cannot 
be directly applied, or judged by its usefulness in the manner of economic or other professional 
knowledge. But what is useless can still be a force, perhaps the only real force.”2 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Values and justice are concepts central to ethics. It is often argued that Heidegger, Derrida and 
the Daoist classics are inadequate in terms of ethical systems. In short, it is said that because they 
challenge the standard theories of ethics and philosophy, there is little or no ethics to be found in 
Heidegger, in Derrida, and in Daoism, and that therefore, they display a kind of nihilist or 
relativist thinking best avoided. In this article I will argue otherwise through an exploration of 
how Heidegger, Derrida, Zhuangzi, and Laozi think about values and justice. It will become 
clear that their thinking of values challenges preconceived notions of value, and indeed 
challenges the importance of thinking in terms of value at all.  
                                                 
1 Heidegger 2003, 36, 43. 
2 Heidegger 1959, 8. 
 2 
Heidegger and Derrida challenge the metaphysical history of Western thought. This 
metaphysical history tends to think in dualist, hierarchical structures by positing values, and is 
still firmly entrenched as the dominant discourse in our days. I will focus on how Heidegger, 
Derrida and Daoism, all in their different ways, challenge a long-standing characteristic of 
metaphysical thought3, that is the separation of Sein and Sollen, Is and Ought. They will argue 
that somehow, Is and Ought, although not identical, are nevertheless inseparable. This challenge 
to the perceived separation of Is and Ought amounts to a re-valuation of the idea of value, and 
with it of justice. Since the connection between justice and value is a close one, the values we 
hold are in an important way those that determine how we think of justice. And since Heidegger, 
Derrida, and the Daoists challenge these values, or at least challenge thinking in terms of values, 
they also challenge standard ideas of justice. 
Following and comparing Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism, the leading idea of this article 
is that thinking in values leads to a hierarchy or form of duality which is inimical to justice. 
Traditionally justice has always been understood as somehow based on equality, or equity, and 
the idea of valuation is based on making artificial and hierarchical distinctions between opposing 
structures. Against this normal sense of value, comparing our protagonists we will see that they 
are really about the value of inclusion or relationality, or interdependence. Although they do this 
in different ways, it will be argued that there is an overall tendency in our protagonists towards a 
more inclusive way of thinking. But this will not translate into justice based on equality or 
sameness or equity, but justice based on difference or otherness. 
 
                                                 
3 I say this reservedly as of course the classical Daoists were not arguing against such a metaphysical system, but 
were more arguing against the Confucian values and worldviews of their own time. Yet it is fruitful to see how their 
arguments can be understood as implicitly challenging metaphysics in this area. 
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2 HEIDEGGER 
Since most of Heidegger’s thinking on values revolves around his treatment of Nietzsche’s 
Umwertung aller Werte, the revaluation of all values, I would like to start there. Heidegger 
argues that the concept of value arises as soon as man is set as a subject opposed to an object. 
According to Heidegger, Nietzsche, as the last metaphysician, necessarily stays within the 
confines of metaphysical thought with his revaluation, since Nietzsche does not question the 
concept or idea of ‘value’, but is rather only concerned with replacing the old set of values with 
something else. Heidegger therefore sees Nietzsche’s Umwertung remaining within the influence 
of the metaphysical foundation in which subject and object are opposed. Nietzsche abolished the 
afterworld, and relocated value in this world, under the will to power.4 According to Heidegger, 
Nietzsche sees value in terms of justice as Richtigkeit. What is appropriate, fitting, but 
appropriateness must be understood here as according to life as Nietzsche sees it. The will to 
power then becomes the principle of valuation, which the subject uses to enhance life. In 
Heidegger’s words: “Will to power manifests itself as the subjectivity that is characterized by 
value thinking.”5 And this is exactly where Heidegger’s objection arises, since he thinks that: 
“Every metaphysics is a ‘system of value-estimations’.”6 Since Heidegger wants to overcome 
this metaphysical way of thought, he must think against the system of valuation, against ‘value 
thinking.’ In the “Letter on Humanism” Heidegger phrases it in the most succinct way:  
To think against “values” is not to maintain that everything interpreted as “a 
value”—“culture,” “art,” “science,” “human dignity,” “world,” and “God”—is 
                                                 
4 I will not go into the question here of whether Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche is correct. At various places 
Derrida, for instance, has questioned Heidegger’s often compelling, but indeed sometimes maybe one-sided 
interpretation of Nietzsche. 
5 Heidegger 1979-1987, vol. III, 200. 
6 Heidegger 1979-1987, vol. III, 202. 
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valueless. Rather, it is important finally to realize that precisely through the 
characterization of something as “a value” what is so valued is robbed of its worth. 
That is to say, by the assessment of something as a value what is valued is 
admitted only as an object for man’s estimation. But what a thing is in its Being is 
not exhausted by its being an object, particularly when objectivity takes the form 
of value. Every valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing. It 
does not let beings: be. Rather, valuing lets beings: be valid—solely as the objects 
of its doing. … To think against values … means rather to bring the clearing of 
the truth of Being before thinking, as against subjectivizing beings into mere 
objects.7 
What Heidegger (and I will claim that Derrida and the Daoists try to do something similar) wants 
is to think before or beyond this distinction of subject and object. Heidegger does not want to 
posit new values (or like Nietzsche, depose of, revalue, or devalue values), but asks for a 
receptive attitude in terms of Gelassenheit that accepts value rather than trying to create it.  
But if Heidegger tries to think beyond values, does that mean that he does not recognise 
any ‘value’? From all those philosophies around surely relativism and nihilism, denying certain 
values, have the least to offer us here in our quest to ‘contribute’ to questions of economics and 
justice. Is Heidegger a relativist or a nihilist? Yes and no. The main idea to understand is that 
Heidegger thinks that relativism and nihilism stay within the system of valuation that is under 
question. Only from within this system can one speak of relativism and nihilism. The question 
for Heidegger rather is not to seek to mend the shortcomings of the system within the system, but 
to undo the shortcomings by stepping outside of the system, again something that I think Derrida 
                                                 
7 Heidegger 1978, 251. 
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and Daoism also try to do, albeit differently. Heidegger says we should go through the current 
nihilism not by returning to previous values or positing new ones, but by overcoming them. For 
example, in Zur Seinsfrage Heidegger explains how relativism and nihilism are the last phases of 
metaphysics, and how it is important to understand them as such in order to even conceive of 
crossing the line to another kind of thinking.8  
Thinking in values denies something, loses something ‘essential.’ If there is something 
left for the term ‘value’, if value still has some meaning, it should be sought not in terms of 
economics, technology, human resources, Gestell, or any other human making or doing. From 
technology to economics, the scientific and metaphysical worldview sees the world in terms of 
resources, objects, value. Heidegger’s Gestell or ‘enframing’ is a good word for this.9 We have 
framed the world in such a way that it only appears within these artificial frames, as objects 
before a subject.10 
Heidegger’s well-known polemic against the philosophy behind modern technology 
(which he qualifies as thinking in values, calculation, goal and means, instrumentality) argues 
that this kind of thinking has pervaded metaphysics, and Heidegger argues for a different way of 
‘existing’, of being in the world. This different way can best be described as a deep or broad 
relationality.  
Two terms, among others, come to mind when thinking of this Heideggerian form of 
relationality11: The first is Auseinandersetzung, usually translated as ‘con-frontation’ or ‘setting-
apart-together’, or even as ‘conversation.’ All these translations are supposed to bring out the 
                                                 
8 See Heidegger 1996a, 421-425. 
9 See Heidegger 1978, 325. 
10 See Heidegger 1978, 321, where Heidegger illustrates this by pointing to the different approaches to the river 
Rhine in the hydro-electric plant (use-value) and in Hölderlin’s poem “the Rhine” to explain why thinking in values 
loses the ‘essence’ of thinking of Being. 
11 I have argued for this kind of relationality in Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism elsewhere. See my “Thinking on the 
Edge: Heidegger, Derrida and the Daoist Gateway (men 門).” (Philosophy East & West, vol. 60, nr. 4, Oct. 2010). 
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idea that Auseinandersetzung brings together what is different in an exposition of these 
differences. The second term is Gelassenheit, usually translated as ‘releasement.’ None of the 
translations are really satisfactory.  
Let us take a closer look at these terms and what Heidegger tries to say with them, 
starting with Auseinandersetzung. Auseinandersetzung or ‘con-frontation’ is what takes place in-
between differences. Opposites, differences, are always already connected in an essential way. 
Importantly, the ‘intimacy’ or unity of the differences does not exist anywhere else but in the 
interplay of the differences. As such, there is no objective or dialectic third vantage point from 
which to judge the differences or into which they get dissolved, and thus no way to value any 
side of oppositional structures higher or lower than the other side. 
Heidegger’s famous reinterpretation of Heraclitus’ fragment about war being the father of 
all things, concludes that con-frontation, as Auseinandersetzung, is the begetter and keeper of all 
things. In this context Heidegger even explicitly names polemos (Heidegger’s Greek basis for 
Auseinandersetzung) as “die Lichtung” 12  (the clearing). In other, very Heideggerian words, 
“Clearing (Lichtung) is never the empty, but the most originary thorough swaying (Wesen) of en-
owning (Ereignis) as the settlement of the countering and strife – the ‘in-between’ held unto the 
ab-ground (Abgrund).”13  
We must now ask how all of this relates to the concepts of value and justice. Con-
frontation is a keeping apart in togetherness, or a thoughtful appropriation (Ereignis) that leaves 
the other as it is itself. To let things show themselves as they are of themselves, to loosely quote 
                                                 
12 Heidegger 1975, 119. 
13 Heidegger 2006, 90, German added. Ereignis is usually and more clearly translated as ‘appropriation’ or ‘event of 
appropriation’, which must not be thought in terms of a subject appropriating an object, but more as a process or 
event which keeps the differences between subject and object while at the same time relating them, or rather 
Ereignis tries to overcome the subject-object way of thinking entirely. Abgrund is usually translated as ‘abyss’, and 
is a word Heidegger uses to highlight the non-metaphysical approach of his thought, being ‘without ground’. 
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the motto of phenomenology, at least Heidegger’s version of it. This means that 
Auseinandersetzung is largely focused around alterity, otherness or foreignness. To con-front is 
to set apart in difference what belongs together exactly because of this difference. An authentic 
self includes the realisation of this otherness, and the task implied to let this otherness be, other, 
itself. As Heidegger puts it: “The appropriation of one’s own is only as the encounter 
(Auseinandersetzung) and guest-like dialogue with the foreign.”14 For Heidegger then, it seems 
that the only value there is, is the value of letting things be themselves, of showing and taking an 
interest in how things are, of not subjecting things to our human wants and frames, but leaving 
them their otherness. It is in this way that Heidegger’s thinking beyond value becomes the 
condition for justice. Justice would be letting things be. 
But before we make hasty decisions here regarding justice, let us see what Heidegger has 
to say about justice. As we saw, in the Nietzsche work he considers Nietzsche’s version of 
justice as what enhances life, given by the dictates of the will to power. But this kind of 
‘appropriateness’ is not exactly how Heidegger sees justice himself. In order to find out 
Heidegger’s own views, we need to go to “The Anaximander Fragment.”15 In its minimal form, 
the fragment runs like this: 
 
… χατὰ τὸ χρεών. Διδόναι γὰρ αὺτὰ δίχην χαὶ τίσιν ὰλλήλοις τη̃ς ὰδιχίας 
 
Traditionally the fragment gets translated along these lines: “… out of necessity…; for they 
suffer punishment and make reparation to one another for their injustice according to the order of 
                                                 
14 Heidegger 1996b, 142, italics in original, German added. 
15 In Heidegger 1975, 13-58. 
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time.”16 Heidegger however, offers a different translation of this part, including a reinterpretation 
of dike and adike. Heidegger first of all does not want to restrict the meaning of the word dike to 
its usual translations of ‘justice’ or ‘right’ as he finds these translations too narrow. He focuses 
on three words in this fragment and says: “The words δίχη, ὰδιχία and τίσις have a broad 
significance which cannot be enclosed within the boundaries of particular disciplines. ‘Broad’ 
does not mean here extensive, in the sense of something flattened or thinned out, but rather far-
reaching, rich, containing much thought.”17 Heidegger accordingly translates dike with Fug, die 
Fuge. In English: what is fitting, what is joined, enjoined, jointure.18  What is, fits itself in 
presencing between having come and going away. It would then seem that this is ‘fitting’ in the 
sense of ‘appropriate’, in der Fuge. Heidegger wonders why the fragment speaks of ‘what is’ as 
being out of joint, aus der Fuge. His answer is that ‘it’ is out of joint in that ‘what is’ seems to 
insist on permanent being: “That which lingers perseveres in its presencing. In this way it 
extricates itself from its transitory while. It strikes the wilful pose of persistence (den Eigensinn 
des Beharrens), no longer concerning itself with whatever else is present. It stiffens—as if this 
were the way to linger—and aims solely for continuance and subsistence.”19 What we can gather 
from this Heideggerian jargon is that the ‘injustice’ of things present lies in them seeking to 
remain present. This is not the ‘just’ way of being or being present, as the ‘right’ way is to linger 
(weilen), which does not consist in insisting on staying, but in coming from nowhere and going 
to nowhere at its own time, what lingers traverses the passage. “The disjunction (Unfuge, adikia) 
consists in the fact that whatever lingers awhile seeks to win for itself a while based solely on the 
                                                 
16 Translation adapted from: Nahm 1964, 39-40. 
17 Heidegger 1975, 21-22. 
18 Note that these words are also used in German for masonry and carpentry\woodwork, and then refer to the ‘seam’ 
or cement that joins the different parts together.  They thus combine the different elements to one connected whole. 
19 Heidegger 1975, 42, German added. 
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model of continuance. Lingering as persisting, considered with respect to the jointure of the 
while, is an insurrection on behalf of sheer endurance.”20 Yet, das Anwesende, ‘what is’, is and is 
not aus der Fuge. Dike, justice, die Fuge, rather pertains when: 
Whatever lingers awhile in presence comes to presence insofar as it lingers; all 
the while, emerging and passing away, and the jointure of the transition from 
approach to withdrawal, continue. This lingering endurance of the transition is 
the enjoined continuance of what is present. The enjoined continuance does not 
at all insist upon sheer persistence.21  
To put it in popular terms, injustice is insisting on staying the same, this being unnatural or rather 
against Being, and justice is going with the flow. Injustice is insisting on keeping the current 
system going where it has outlived its usefulness, has fossilised and is now a hindrance rather 
than a help, justice is letting it go and starting to think differently. 
Yet what exactly does Heidegger mean with this Fug? The most obvious translation tells 
us something already. It is ‘jointure’ (things belonging together), or enjoining. But Heidegger 
gives the answer himself a bit later when he focuses on the rest of the fragment and especially on 
the third important word in this fragment: τίσις (tisis). Heidegger plays with the possible 
translations of ‘consideration’, ‘heeding’, and ‘esteeming’, but settles on Ruch (Reck) and 
connects this with geruhen (to deign, to respect), Rücksicht (consideration, regard, 
thoughtfulness) and Sorge (care).22 In short, what is right or just, appropriate, is consideration of 
other things, a giving room, or letting things belong or be what they inherently are. And this 
Heidegger connects with the first part of the fragment, χατὰ τὸ χρεών (kata to kreon). 
                                                 
20 Heidegger 1975, 43. 
21 Heidegger 1975, 43-44. 
22 Heidegger 1975, 46-47. 
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Translating kreon with Brauch, ‘usage’, sounds like a return to the notion of value. Things that 
are present are for usage, they have use-value. But this would be a complete misunderstanding of 
what Heidegger is trying to say. As with other words, Heidegger does not mean usage in this 
sense, but rather as the enjoyment of what is as it is, making usage fall in tune with Sorge (care) 
and Ruch (reck). To explain this I would like to introduce the word ‘reckoning’ as a possible 
translation for Ruch or reck. This will have the advantage of doing two things: first of all it gives 
us an English word we can all understand and relate to, instead of Heideggerian jargon, and 
second it will show exactly how words like this are reinterpreted by Heidegger. To ‘reckon’ in 
our modern minds is connected to verbs like ‘to calculate’, ‘to account for’, ‘to estimate’, ‘to 
weigh up’, etc. These words show clearly the metaphysical or scientistic attitude that Heidegger 
wants to argue against with his whole polemic against ‘values.’ Yet at the same time, going back 
to what Heidegger would call a more ‘originary’ meaning of the word ‘reckoning’, it can be seen 
as ‘consideration’, ‘thoughtfulness’, ‘attentiveness’, and even ‘value’, as long as it is clear now 
that value is thought differently. 
Based on all this it is fair to conclude that the order of things, appropriateness (dike), then 
seems to demand that second of Heidegger’s key ideas: Gelassenheit. As mentioned earlier, it 
seems that for Heidegger, justice is Gelassenheit. This ‘releasement’ is not a passive detachment, 
but an attitude that lies beyond the opposition passive versus active. Releasement is keeping an 
open mind towards the mystery of the world and of existence. It is aimed at creating an openness 
toward otherness in which things can ‘be’ what they are, it is a letting-things-be as they are, and 
not, as in dualistic philosophy, to oppose or try to master them and see them as something usable 
or valuable. Since in this Heideggerian kind of relational thought it is understood that self and 
other are essentially connected, there naturally arises a feeling of care or concern for (Sorge), and 
 11 
reckoning with (which is not calculation) the world that we inhabit. If we must speak of value 
here, the only value is intrinsic value, in and of itself, and not for something else.  
Heidegger thinks that with the history of metaphysics, things have been increasingly “out 
of joint.” To counter this, as Heidegger thinks we should, we must overcome ‘value thinking’ 
and learn to be in tune with the Ereignis or ‘event of appropriation’ by thinking the jointure, and 
by reckoning, in short, by practising Gelassenheit. In “The Anaximander fragment” it is said that 
justice gives (didonai diken) Fuge gibt.23 But it can only give, offer or be given when we are 
attentive to it. This only happens if we become aware of the relationality of ourselves with the 
rest of the world, which in turn creates a form of justice as ‘letting things be.’ 
 
3 DERRIDA 
In Specters of Marx Derrida begins with a quote from Shakespeare’s Hamlet, where Hamlet says: 
“the time is out of joint.”24 Derrida uses this quote to question Heidegger on this so-called Gift of 
Justice. As Heidegger himself had already noted, this gift is problematic since it seems 
impossible for something which is ‘out of joint’ to give ‘jointure.’ Derrida notices that Heidegger 
indeed seems to argue that justice is “the jointure of the accord: the proper jointure to the other 
given by one who does not have it. Injustice would be the disjointure or disjoining.”25 Derrida 
questions the privilege Heidegger seems to give to jointure, over and against disjointure, and 
rhetorically asks:  
does not justice as a relation to the other suppose on the contrary the irreducible 
excess of a disjointure or an anachrony, some Unfuge, some ‘out of joint’ 
                                                 
23 Heidegger 1975, 43. 
24 Quoted in various places in Derrida 2006, for example page 1. 
25 Derrida 2006, 31-32. 
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dislocation in Being and in time itself, a disjointure that, in always risking the 
evil, expropriation, and injustice (adikia) against which there is no calculable 
insurance, would alone be able to do justice or to render justice to the other as 
other?26  
For Derrida then, the asymmetry of the disjointure, rather than the jointure, is the condition on 
which justice is founded. This disjointure is understood by Derrida as the irreducible difference 
of each singular other, much in the sense that Levinas understood this. Derrida’s justice is 
literally induced by otherness. In Simon Critchley’s words: “It is the demand provoked by the 
other’s decision in me that calls forth political invention, that provokes me into inventing a norm 
and taking a decision. The singularity of the context in which the demand arises provokes an act 
of invention whose criterion is universal.”27 The other gives us the decision to make, yet this 
decision is not based on any higher principle, like it was in Kant’s categorical imperative, but as 
a direct result of the other’s difference. 
Derrida is suggesting that the other or difference, although always singular and always 
irreducibly different, is also always already inserted into any form of identity, be it cultural, 
individual or otherwise. There is no self without other, there is no jointure without disjointure, 
and what is other is constitutive for what is considered a self or identity. The play of différance at 
work here suggests that there are no pure identities, there is rather pure relationality of which 
identities are at best useful heuristic functions. This is how the ‘universal’ in the above quote 
from Critchley should be understood. The demand is ‘universal’ since it comes from the 
singularity of every other, and since this alterity is always part of identity. And in this way justice 
is seen by Derrida as a direct outcome of this relationality. This demand of the other, this 
                                                 
26 Derrida 2006, 32, italics in original. 
27 Critchley 2004, 180. 
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decision of the other, is incalculable, does not work according to any pre-set principle. In 
Negotiations Derrida puts it in the following way:  
The decision … is never certain. If one were sure of the calculation, it would not 
be an action or a decision; it would be programming. There must be decision, 
there must be absolute risk, and there must be the undecidable. There is no 
decision without the undecidable. If there are no undecidables, there is no 
decision. There is simply programming, calculation. There must be political, 
ethical decisions, but these decisions are possible only in situations where the 
undecidable is a necessary dilemma…28 
As usual, Derrida is talking about a double bind. One must make decisions, yet these decisions 
seem impossible since if they only follow reasons, calculations and values, they are nothing more 
than programme following, and hence not real decisions. There is no real foundation for real 
decisions. One might go so far as to say that the undecidability of the decision is the foundation. 
Derrida again, this time in Politics of Friendship:  
the instant of decision must remain heterogeneous to all knowledge as such, to all 
theoretical or reportive determination, even if it may and must be preceded by all 
possible science and conscience. The latter are unable to determine the leap of 
decision without transforming it into the irresponsible application of a programme, 
hence without depriving it of what makes it a sovereign and free decision – in a 
word, of what makes it a decision, if there is one.29  
This means that this decision making can only be done in direct response to the situation. This is 
probably why Derrida prefers to talk about singular others, about singular deconstructions 
                                                 
28 Derrida 2002, 31. 
29 Derrida 2005, 219. 
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instead of deconstruction as a programme. There is an interesting passage in Limited Inc. that 
could make us fully understand and appreciate this profound relationality in Derrida’s thinking. 
Expounding on the infamous “There is no outside of the text”, Derrida says that what he was 
really saying with this is “that nothing exists outside context . . ., but also that the limit of the 
frame or the border of the context always entails a clause of non-closure. The outside penetrates 
and thus determines the inside.”30 This contextuality itself is constitutive of any identity, and as 
context it can never be closed off, it is structurally and inherently open, since it is nothing more 
or less than “the entire ‘real-history-of-the-world.’”31 
Derrida’s extreme openness towards alterity and the importance of alterity, otherness and 
difference, is not to be seen as a relativism. Things are not complete and full unto themselves, 
but the fact that Derrida criticises this fullness or completeness does not mean we are left with 
meaninglessness per se. The complication to which Derrida’s thinking points is not a pure 
rejection of value or meaning, but it thinks differently, relationally, on these subjects. This then 
is the similarity between Heidegger and Derrida: Both seek to convey the idea that the traditional 
or metaphysical way of thought on which our economic and justice systems is based, is incapable 
of thinking this relationality, since it is stuck in the subject-object distinction. Both want to 
convey the idea that thinking of values and justice, we need to go beyond this metaphysical way 
of thought, to include otherness into our considerations in a different, more fundamental way, 
than the calculation of modernity does. 
Derrida makes a clear distinction between law (droit) and justice. Law belongs to the 
realm of calculation, it is measurable, it is rule-following, whereas justice is exactly that which 
goes beyond such rule-following. In his own words: “Law is the element of calculation, and it is 
                                                 
30 Derrida 1988, 152-153. 
31 Derrida 1988, 136. 
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just that there be law, but justice is incalculable, it requires us to calculate with the 
incalculable.”32 Derrida says that we should deal (or maybe ‘reckon’) with this kind of aporia in 
the area of justice, since the experience of justice, and its foundation, can never be assessed with 
the same criteria as law. Man-made values such as law are always based on what Derrida calls a 
‘violent’ or ‘mystical’ foundation, meaning they themselves require something to found them, 
but this something is itself beyond the idea of foundation. We would like to find a foundation for 
justice, but we realise that we cannot find such a thing, or that all the attempts and suggestions, 
like equality, are seriously problematic. We must then acknowledge that justice as such is the 
foundation for which there is no further ground. As such, Derrida can say: “Justice in itself, if 
such a thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructible. No more than deconstruction 
itself, if such a thing exists. Deconstruction is justice.”33  
The singularity of every other highlighted previously makes every other constitutive for 
our self and irreplaceable, and as such, we are responsible for it. Derrida establishes this by 
extending the notion of responsiveness to the other towards that of responsibility. What is other 
is something which must come of its own, but as Derrida says: “it is necessary to prepare for it; 
for to allow the coming of the entirely other, passivity, a certain kind of resigned passivity for 
which everything comes down to the same, is not suitable. Letting the other come is not inertia 
opening to anything whatever.” 34  With this Derrida is arguing for a position similar to 
Heidegger’s Gelassenheit (Releasement). 
Heidegger and Derrida were very much proponents of an ethical way of life, yet it is hard 
to establish where Gelassenheit or the decision to responsibility lead in actual societies. 
                                                 
32 Derrida in Carlson, Cornell & Rosenfeld 1992, 16 
33 Derrida in Carlson, Cornell & Rosenfeld 1992, 14-15. 
34 Derrida 2007, 39. 
 16 
Derrida’s ethical ideas stem largely from Levinas’ notion of the other, whereby otherness is 
always perceived as singular. Ethics arises as a direct consequence of an opening towards what is 
‘other’, both in Heidegger and in Derrida. Since what is ‘other’ is always inserted into the self, 
and thus constitutive for it, it becomes impossible not to acknowledge the other, and that means a 
responsiveness that entails a responsibility. This responsibility is direct, not derived from some 
greater source or origin, but purely as a consequence of the relationality to alterity or difference. 
There is thus, I would claim, as in Heidegger, also a direct relation between Is and Ought in 
Derrida, which he has also described as a philosophy of ‘affirmation’ consonant with the 
‘decision to justice.’ 
So where does this leave the idea of value in Derrida? Although Derrida does not speak 
much about value itself, we can at least say that it should be turned away from the calculation 
that is economical value. Bartering, exchange in value, in economic exchange remains 
calculation. We should see value as something else, something that cannot be calculated. The 
relation between value and justice should at the very least be turned around. It is not that value 
comes first, and justice would be the calculated outcome of values, but rather that justice is the 
incalculable origin of values. Justice is undecidable, incalculable through other things such as 
values. A philosophy of affirmation such as that of Derrida and of Daoism is called for. All 
societies and all contracts already presuppose one affirmation, and this must be tied to justice. 
Yet this affirmation is a moment of injustice and violence, it is not itself supported by anything 
else.35 Thus the double bind, and the ‘time out of joint.’ This affirmation should also not be seen 
as a moment ‘before’ the (just) society arises, but as a constant reminder of the necessity to 
                                                 
35 See for example Derrida’s “The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of its Pupils” in Derrida 2004, 
where he argues for a similar lack of Reason in the foundation of the University as a place of Reason, or Derrida & 
Bennington 1993, 231. 
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negotiate between the incalculable foundation of justice (which lies in the demand of the other) 
and the practical application of the law.36  
 
4 DAOISM 
As a preliminary to my claim that the distinction between Is and Ought does not feature 
prominently in Daoism, I would first like to look at the seat of thought, xin心. Thinking and 
feeling are related through the character xin. In the words of Roger Ames and David Hall: “in 
this classical Chinese worldview broadly conceived, the mind cannot be divorced from the heart. 
There are not altogether rational thoughts devoid of feelings, not any raw feelings altogether 
lacking in cognitive content. … [T]he prejudice to which Daoism is resolutely resistant is the 
dichotomy between the cognitive and the affective that would privilege knowing as some 
separate cognitive activity.” 37  The non-distinction of thinking and feeling, of the so-called 
objective reason and subjective affections, leads one to at least suspect that in Daoism, thinking 
would have an ethical component.  
To understand how Daoism sees values and valuation, let us consult the Daodejing, 
especially those chapters that attack Confucianism as an artificial valuation system. It then 
immediately becomes clear that this valuation system, and its values, are intimately connected 
with, and the result of, ‘doing’ (wei 為) and ‘discrimination’ or ‘disputation’ (pian辨). Although 
Confucius makes it look as if his system is natural, the chapters in the Daodejing that directly 
attack Confucianism show that it is not. The wu forms, especially wuwei無為, so prominent in 
                                                 
36 See Derrida & Bennington 1993, 228-241. 
37 Ames & Hall 2003, 26. 
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Daoism, are obviously directed against such a way of doing and discriminating.38 It is therefore 
that chapters such as 3, 5, and 12 promote an attitude against hierarchical valuation. And 
especially in chapters 18, 19, and 38, where Confucianism and its artificial values are directly 
targeted, we see that it is only when dao道 is lost, that we get what are usually seen as values. 
Only when dao is lost, do we value certain things over others, which is the core of valuation in 
the first place: valuation makes things relative to each other, and immediately places an 
unacceptable artificial value on certain things over other things. Only then does an artificial and 
human-centred moral system arise, where ‘knowledge’ zhi 知 discriminates between different 
humans, and between humans and the rest of the world, thus distinguishing humans in the 
process of introducing values. As said in Chapter 2 of the Daodejing: “As soon as everyone in 
the world knows that the beautiful are beautiful, there is already ugliness. As soon as everyone 
knows the able, there is ineptness.”39 Or in Chapter 5: “The heavens and earth are not partial to 
institutionalized morality.”40 And finally in Chapter 18: “It is only when grand way-making [dao] 
is abandoned, that authoritative conduct (ren) and appropriateness (yi) appear.”41 Many other 
passages of the Daodejing convey a similar message. 
In the words of Ames and Hall, Daoist knowing is something completely opposite to the 
Confucian way: Daoist “[k]nowledge, as unprincipled knowing, is the acceptance of the world 
on its own terms without recourse to rules of discrimination that separate one sort of thing from 
                                                 
38 Superficially it might be said that in the Laozi there is more focus on the attack on ‘doing’, and in the Zhuangzi 
there is more focus on the attack on ‘discriminating.’ 
39 Daodejing, Ames & Hall 2003, 80. 
40 Daodejing, Ames & Hall 2003, 84. 
41 Daodejing, Ames & Hall 2003, 103. Ren and yi are in Ames & Hall’s original text, dao is added. 
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another.” 42  And further on, in the commentary on chapter 38, they argue that “[t]echnical 
morality, imposed from without, is no more than a record of steady moral deterioration. The 
more elaborate the terms of such norms, the clearer is the indication that morality has slipped 
from what we do spontaneously and unconsciously…”43 
Discrimination is valuation, and setting values is the beginning of the end. The extreme 
perspectivism of the Daodejing conveys a relational understanding of the world, whereby it 
becomes impossible to differentiate hierarchically between things, or even between oneself and 
other things, and as such, the Daodejing goes directly against the very idea of valuation, 
hierarchy. It is much better to at least try to stay as close as possible to ‘the uncarved block of 
wood’, where such discriminations and valuations are not yet prominent. In fact, returning to the 
uncarved block is imperative to undo the ‘damage’ of the artificial Confucian value system. In 
chapter 28: “When unworked wood is split, it is made into utensils. When the sages are 
employed, they are made into head officials. There is no cutting, however, in the very best 
tailoring.”44 
Similar ides are found in Zhuangzi, who argues that thinking in values is a sign of “chop 
logic”,45 whereby in the system of ‘discriminations’ preferences are given to one thing rather 
than another, which goes against dao. In Zhuangzi’s words: “To ‘discriminate between 
alternatives’ is to fail to see something.”46 Making artificial distinctions, which seems to be the 
key idea of valuation in the first place, leads one to value some things over others, where the 
                                                 
42 Ames & Hall 2003, 41. The so-called rules mentioned by Ames and Hall include: “Rules of thumb, habits of mind 
and action, established customs, fixed standards, received methods, stipulated concepts and categories, 
commandments, principles, laws of nature, conventions.”  
43 Ames & Hall 2003, 137. 
44 Daodejing, Ames & Hall 2003, 121. Other chapters conveying similar ideas through the ‘uncarved block’ include 
15, 19, 32, and 37. 
45 Zhuangzi, Graham 2001, 55, 82. 
46 Zhuangzi, Graham 2001, 57. 
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Daoist tries to get beyond that distinction. This process of valuation as a departure from dao is 
described in Chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi:  
The understanding of the men of ancient times went a long way. How far did it go? 
To the point where some of them believed that things have never existed-so far, to 
the end, where nothing can be added. Those at the next stage thought that things 
exist but recognized no boundaries among them. Those at the next stage thought 
there were boundaries but recognized no right and wrong. Because right and 
wrong appeared, the Way was injured…47 
The fact that the ancient Daoists recognized no boundaries between themselves and the rest of 
the world is an indication that they thought in terms of relationality, where one’s self is 
considered as continuous with others and other things. Consequently they saw morality as arising 
spontaneously, as a direct result of our being in the world with others and everything around us, 
and in that sense Daoism shows a proximity to Heidegger’s Gelassenheit and to Derrida’s 
decision without ground. 
Staying with the Zhuangzi we must also look at the usefulness of being useless. Zhuangzi 
says in chapter 4: “All men know the uses of the useful, but no one knows the uses of the 
useless.”48 Stories of this uselessness and its usefulness for those who are useless abound in the 
Zhuangzi. Most of these passages praise uselessness, but one passage in the Zhuangzi is 
ambivalent: the story of the good-for-nothing goose that gets killed,49 where there seems to be a 
different approach to this uselessness. I think this rests on a mistaken conflation between two 
ways of using language in the concept of usefulness and uselessness. The tree in a previous story 
                                                 
47 Zhuangzi, Watson 2003, 36-37.  
48 Zhuangzi, Graham 2001, 75. 
49 Zhuangzi, Graham 2001, 121. 
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is useless, so it is spared. The goose is useless, so it dies. But the tree is totally useless to humans, 
there is nothing it could be used for, so it is left alone. Yet the goose is not as useless as it seems. 
Although it cannot cackle, this does not mean it has lost its use-value as food to humans. So it is 
killed rather for being useful than for being useless. Even the cackling goose will not escape this 
fate. With that I think we can still hold on to the idea of the use of uselessness in Zhuangzi. I do 
not wish to absolutise ‘uselessness’ in Zhuangzi’s perspectivist thought, but I do think that he 
displays a general mistrust of ‘usefulness’ and in that sense Zhuangzi is definitely defending the 
idea that once something or someone becomes useful or valuable, there is a good chance things 
will go wrong and depart from dao. 
Having value or thinking in terms of values and discriminations can then be seen as being 
denied the possibility of possessing dao. Being valuable means you are stuck, like Confucius 
(who admits so himself according to Zhuangzi in chapter 6)50, in an arbitrary and artificial 
system. This does not mean that the Daoist is totally against all values or norms. One needs 
provisional values, but we should take care to see these in the same way as the Daoists see 
language. Language is not to be discarded totally, but to be used sparingly, with full awareness 
of its provisional status. Laozi recognises this in chapter 32: “When we start to regulate the 
world we introduce names. But once names have been assigned, we must also know when to stop. 
Knowing when to stop is how to avoid danger.”51 In a way that might be seen as similar to 
Derrida, Laozi recognises the unavoidability of naming and calculating, yet stays aware of the 
unnameable and incalculable (non-)foundation of this.  
Turning again to the Zhuangzi, according to Graham, even Zhuangzi the relativist does 
indeed recognise two kinds of value as worthy of his considerations, filial piety and the duty of 
                                                 
50 Zhuangzi, Graham 2001, 89-90. 
51 Daodejing, Ames & Hall 2003, 127. 
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minister to ruler.52 The first duty is to Zhuangzi a natural one, and not artificial. The second, 
although it is a duty, is best avoided by not taking office, and only comes into play when taking 
office is unavoidable. These duties or values arise naturally out of the direct context of what we 
are, and are not imposed by some principle that would stand outside of these contexts. Aside 
from these, Zhuangzi does not accept the other values common to the traditional Chinese world, 
like status, ritual, bodily intactness. The thing to do is not to set value by conventional standards, 
but to value all alike without prejudice. In Zhuangzi, we can say that either everything has value, 
or nothing has value over anything else. In either case, introducing a hierarchy in value is 
something that Zhuangzi is against. Lun論, the sorting and grading that is part of the title of the 
second chapter, is highly spoken of by Zhuangzi, yet, as the title of this chapter suggests, 
Zhuangzi’s lun is “The sorting which evens things out.”53 Zhuangzi finds as much value in trees, 
skulls, cripples etc. as in the human world. In the Zhuangzi there is a dismissal of any value 
judgment that thinks of values in terms of hierarchy.  
Yet how else can we think of value? The only possible answer here would be as all-
inclusive. When the inquirer in the Autumn Floods chapter, bewildered by Zhuangzi’s insistent 
attack on the idea of value, asks what the value of dao is, the answer is simple: having dao 
means you are aware of the patterns and intricacies of the world, and as such you will be able to 
see clearly and act accordingly: “Whoever knows the Way is sure of penetrating the patterns, 
whoever penetrates the patterns is sure to be clear-headed in weighing things, whoever is clear-
headed in weighing things will not use other things to his own harm.”54 Not using other things to 
his own harm must be understood here in the light of what the Zhuangzi says elsewhere: “The 
                                                 
52 Graham 2001, 13. 
53 Zhuangzi, Graham 2001, 48. 
54 Zhuangzi, Graham 2001, 149. 
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utmost man uses the heart like a mirror; he does not escort things as they go or welcome them as 
they come, he responds and does not store.”55 This sounds like the sage does not care much about 
things, but that would be the wrong way to see this. Since value is inherent in everything, and the 
Daoist sage recognises this inherent value in all things, because they are all valuable from some 
point of view, the sage responds to things by letting them be what their nature intends. This is the 
basis for justice as letting be of others, as giving space to diversity. This is indeed the way for the 
sage, and is consistent with the Daoist version of a wuwei government: Do not interfere with the 
natural inclination of things, let them run their course without artificially, and hierarchically, 
valuing them. Note however, that this view is not metaphysical in any way. The wider, 
encompassing view of the sage is not one from outside of the world, but one which takes all 
viewpoints of the world as viewpoints, and sees the patterns by which the world works as 
necessary. 
 
5 BRINGING HEIDEGGER, DERRIDA AND DAOISM TOGETHER 
On the ethical level, notions of letting things take their natural course are readily found both in 
Heidegger and Daoism. And together with Derrida’s idea of responsiveness, all three advocate 
an attitude of openness to things unfamiliar, a letting be of difference. This is in response to the 
perceived artificiality of the ideas current in their respective times. Thus the Daoists argue 
against the artificial Confucian standards, which they see as an obstacle to the development of 
natural or unmediated morality. Morality in this unmediated sense will develop of itself, it is 
ziran自然 or spontaneous, without the artificial imposition of rules and regulations. Heidegger 
argues against the ‘they’ (Man) attitude of social conventions and tries to establish how 
                                                 
55 Zhuangzi, Graham 2001, 98. 
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Gelassenheit could help us overcome this artificial approach. Derrida searches for ways to affirm 
otherness and to criticise the dominance of certain power systems and the metaphysical way of 
seeing things. With this he seeks to establish a natural responsiveness to others that is certainly 
ethical. I thus think that there is a definite ethical dimension to Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism. 
Zhuangzi’s sages respond spontaneously, and this responding is comparable to Derrida’s 
responsiveness as responsibility, since in a similar move Zhuangzi is not interested in an 
emotional, or passionate responding to things (as would the Romanticist), but rather in an 
“impersonal calm”56 where responding means to let things take their own course. It is this kind of 
justice and responsibility that must be thought of as the indeconstructible ‘source’ of our thought, 
and of our coexistence (with everything) in the world. In this way responsiveness does lead to 
responsibility. Thus, contrary to popular opinion, I do not think that there is no ethical dimension 
to this view. This is what one would assume: a so-called objective, birds-eye (think of Peng) 
view tends for Westerners to be equated with the dichotomy of Is and Ought, where accordingly, 
objectivity is seen as ‘valueless’ seeing. Such an objective view would see how things are, but 
would not be able to see how they should be. Yet this idea of objectivity is rejected in Heidegger, 
Derrida, and Laozi and Zhuangzi, who claim (maybe in different, but compatible ways) that their 
views, in the form of a spontaneous responsiveness to the world that does not go by conventional 
standards, lead to a responsibility to safeguard the natural way things are, that is to safeguard, to 
let be. And thus to deny the kind of objectivity functioning at the basis of the Is-Ought 
distinction. 
According to Heidegger, Gelassenheit is not negative or passive, but an attitude which 
entails an abandoning of the subjective self to the primacy of the event, the Ereignis. Similarly, 
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wuwei as non-assertive action does not mean one should not speak or act, but that one will speak 
and behave in a way that does not unnaturally restrict others. The ethical implications of this are 
obvious: The self should act in a way that recognises the spontaneity of the other, and should not 
impose conventional expectations and restrictions on the other. The similarity between ziran and 
wuwei and Gelassenheit is that there is recognition of the primacy of the relationality, of the 
spontaneity of the other. Karyn Lai puts it in the following way:  
If ziran is understood as spontaneity and we are to foster it, we must, in simple 
terms, refrain from interference: allowing for the spontaneity of an individual 
requires us not to impose unnecessary constraints on this individual … In other 
words, it is to practice wuwei.57 
So Gelassenheit, responsiveness as responsibility, ziran and wuwei entail a realisation of the 
uniqueness and spontaneity of each situation, of each response to the other. And this should be 
the ‘ground’ or rather ‘non-ground’ for justice. The focus is not on the other as an oppositional 
figure, an object for a subject, but on the realisation of the other, and I mean realisation in both 
terms of the word, as a necessary complement to the self and its development, and as something 
that naturally causes some kind of feeling of responsibility for its well-being, at least through not 
interfering with its natural inclinations.  
  
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Morality in such an unmediated sense as described above will develop of itself, it is spontaneous, 
without the artificial imposition of rules and regulations. As such it can be said to deny the 
dichotomy of Is and Ought. Thinking beyond values or use for Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism 
                                                 
57 Lai 2007, 332. Lai mentions a number of chapters from the Daodejing in this context: 12, 18, 19, 20, 37 and 53. 
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can thus seem ‘useless’ from the perspective of thought that maintains this dichotomy. I suggest 
that currently some of the best efforts at ‘contributing’ to questions of values, economics, and 
justice, still seem to be entrenched in a system of philosophy incapable of challenging its own 
presuppositions. And these presuppositions reflect themselves in (or are the reflections of) the 
wider system of thought in economics whereby the western system of doing things is being 
transplanted globally. Based on what I have argued in this article, I thus think that in the end 
what we need is not this kind of philosophy’s contribution to a sustainable economic growth, 
since that system of growth seems to be exactly what causes the problems. I also don’t think that 
equality will continue to function meaningfully as the basis of justice in the same way it has, 
since in our plural, multicultural societies, it is increasingly the differences we are concerned 
with, differences we recognise and want to keep. Different cultures, different people have 
different values, and although it is extremely useful to see where our similarities lie, it seems far 
more useful to see how we can make those differences productive, and for that I do think we 
need to drastically change our way of thinking of values. There needs to be a paradigm shift from 
the artificial ways of thinking about values and justice to an alternative way of thought that 
perceives them as spontaneously arising from what is our situation, instead of trying to 
artificially imposing them on this situation. I hope to have shown that there are resources in 
Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism that can ‘contribute’ to this. 
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